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ABSTRACT
In Sanchez v. Kalauokalani (1917), the Supreme Court of  the Territory of  Hawai‘i held that 
Manuel Olivieri Sánchez and Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens pursuant to the 
Jones Act. Centering on Sanchez and its aftermath, this essay investigates their fi ght for 
U.S. citizenship—both its attainment and the realization of  the supposed benefi ts of  that 
citizenship—in the face of  laws and policies that legitimized unequal treatment. Drawing on 
critical theory insights, it explores how Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans held both a deep criticism 
of  law as a tool of  the powerful, as well as a transformative vision of  law as a vehicle to 
validate their place in the U.S. polity. Embracing a “double consciousness” about law and 
rights assertion, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans fought for legal rights in Sanchez, but recognized that 
U.S. citizenship would not mean immediate freedom from discriminatory treatment. They 
therefore pushed for the attendant rights of  that citizenship, and against cultural vilifi cation 
and inferior treatment in their daily lives. In doing so, they sought to compel powerful actors 
and institutions to recognize their humanity and dignity. [Key words: Puerto Ricans, Hawai‘i, 
law, citizenship, double consciousness, Sanchez v. Kalauokalani]
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I. INTRODUCTION
Only weeks after the passage of the Jones Act—which in 1917 collectively naturalized 
“citizens of Puerto Rico” as U.S. citizens—Manuel Olivieri Sánchez, a Puerto Rican 
residing in the Territory of Hawai‘i, traveled to the Honolulu county clerk’s office to 
register to vote in the upcoming Hawai‘i elections. David Kalauokalani, the county 
clerk, refused to place Olivieri Sánchez’s name on the great register of voters. 
The clerk admitted that Olivieri Sánchez “[was] a [U.S.] citizen according to 
the cable which came from Washington,” but he claimed that “I don’t know 
anything officially, and I must hear from the Governor, and he must issue a 
proclamation.”1 Across the ter ritory, Puerto Ricans who attempted to register 
to vote were turned away (Carr 1989, 235). 
Olivieri Sánchez fought back. He filed a writ of  mandamus to compel the 
clerk to register him and other Puerto Rican residents. In the first and only case 
to rule upon the citizenship of  Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i following the Jones 
Act, the lower court ruled that Olivieri Sánchez did not become a U.S. citizen 
upon the Act’s passage. According to the court, Congress intended to make 
Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens only if  they “remained inhabitants of  Porto Rico, 
giving them thereby a citizenship anal[o]gous to State citizenship . . . which 
would be lost by removal from Porto Rico” (Sanchez v. Kalauokal ani 1917, 7; 
see also Porto Ricans Here Not Entitled to Vote in Territory 1917, 7).2 Puerto 
Ricans in Hawai‘i were declared a people “without a country.”3 
Six months later, the Supreme Court of  the Territory of  Hawai‘i reversed. 
In Sanchez v. Kalauokalani, the court held that Olivieri Sánchez became a U.S. 
citizen pursuant to the Jones Act even though he had moved to Hawai‘i in 
1901. According to the court, under the Jones Act, all “citizens of  Porto Rico” 
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(as defined by the 1900 Foraker Act) acquired U.S. citizenship. Nothing in the 
Act, it found, evinced Congress’ intent “to exclude . . . citizens of  Porto Rico, 
. . . who were at the date of  the act of  March 2, 1917, absent from Porto 
Rico” (Sanchez v. Kalauokalani 1917, 27). Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans celebrated this 
hard-fought legal victory. As newly recognized U.S. citizens—and because of  
Olivieri Sánchez’s advocacy and the community’s solidarity—Puerto Ricans in 
Hawai‘i attained the right to vote in the Territory and a measure of  economic 
mobility (Carr 1989, 354). 
At the same time, U.S. citizenship changed little about the legal and social 
climate for Puerto Rican laborers in Hawai‘i. They were still cast as “vagrants” 
and “lawbreakers,” rounded up and imprisoned based on actions of  a few, 
forced to live in some of  the worst plantation housing, and marginalized based 
on the fear that they—as U.S. citizens—would gain increased political power 
(see Part IV, section C of  paper). Puerto Ricans therefore continued to protest 
laws that governed the territory, both on and off  of  the sugar plantations. 
They sent petitions to newspapers in Puerto Rico and to the federal and local 
governments asserting that they were denied basic rights, treated inhumanely 
on the plantations, arrested and punished without cause, and left without 
recourse (Córdova Dávila 1919).4 In 1919, for example, a group of  Puerto 
Ricans u rged the Puerto Rico legislature to prevent additional Puerto Rican 
laborers from traveling to Hawai‘i because, while “the law of  the lash does 
not exist today on the plantations[,] there is still committed a large number of  
wrongs against the Porto Ricans…” (Córdova Dávila 1919).
They knew the value of  rights under law—and fought for them—but at the same 
time were aware that legal recognition as U.S. citizens would not mean freedom from 
discriminatory treatment through policy and by the populace.
Sanchez v. Kalauokalani—decided amidst harsh plantation practices and 
vagrancy laws deployed to subjugate Puerto Ricans and other workers of  
color—sheds light on Puerto Ricans’ experiences with law and legal process in 
Hawai‘i. Rather than rejecting the law as a tool only of  the powerful, or blindly 
embracing the law as a silver bullet, I contend that Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans 
embraced what W.E.B. Du Bois termed a “double consciousness” about their 
experience with law and rights assertion (DuBois 2007, 8; Matsuda 1987, 340–
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41). Puerto Ricans held both a deep criticism of  the ways in which laws were 
used to benefit those in power as well as an aspirational and transformative 
vision of  law as a vehicle to validate their place in the U.S. polity. They knew 
the value of  rights under law—and fought for them—but at the same time 
were aware that legal recognition as U.S. citizens would not mean freedom 
from discriminatory treatment through policy and by the populace. This 
duality served as a source of  resilience in the face of  injustice. 
As critical theorists recognize, the double consciousness of  those at 
the bottom “accommodates both the idea of  legal indeterminacy as well as 
the core belief  in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy” (Matsuda 
1987, 341). Indeed, outsiders have intimate knowledge of  th e legal system’s 
injustice against subordinated others, and acknowledge that aspects of  that 
subordination would continue even if  they achieve “legal rights.” But these 
outsiders also have “passionately invoked legal doctrine, legal ideals, and liberal 
theory in the struggle” against injustice and have succeeded in part because 
of  the “passionate response that conventional legalism can at times elicit” 
(Matsuda 1987, 338; Harris 1994, 744). For this reason, critical race theor ists 
underscore the importance of  rights assertion for oppressed peoples and 
communities of  color as a vehicle to compel powerful actors and institutions 
to recognize disempowered people’s dignity and humanity. 
Drawing on realist and critical theory insights, and through archival 
research, this article explores how Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i, despite their 
small numbers and lack of  political clout, asserted their claims to U.S. 
citizenship in the same courts and political climate that regularly contributed 
to their subjugation. They did so knowing that it would be difficult to achieve 
judicial recognition of  new legal rights and that, even if  so recognized, mere 
possession of  those rights would not necessarily transform their treatment or 
status in society. By simultaneously being “aware of  the historical abuse of  law” 
while embracing “law as a tool of  necessity,” they made “legal consciousness 
their own in order to attack injustice” (Matsuda 1992, 298). Indeed, although 
the sugar oligarchy controlled the legal system, Puerto Ricans perceived the 
distinct value of  rights and fought for and attained U.S. citizenship in Sanchez. 
While recognizing that formal U.S. citizenship would not automatically confer 
“first class” citizenship, they saw the need to push for the attendant rights of  
that citizenship as well as against cultural vilification and inferior treatment in 
their daily lives. 
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Part II provides a brief  overview of  the early Puerto Rican experience in 
Hawai‘i, focusing particularly on the systematic negative racialization of  Puerto 
Ricans by plantation interests and Hawai‘i’s territorial government to control 
the labor force and suppress political activity. Part III explores t he concept 
of  “double consciousness.” Looking to realist and critical theories, this Part 
explores the ways in which oppressed groups can have a profound cynicism 
about law and legal process while embracing the historical and social role that 
rights have played in securing justice (Hutchinson 2003, 632). Part IV applies 
the double consciousness concept to the Hawai‘i Puerto Rican experience 
during the years surrounding Puerto Ricans’ collective naturalization. Centering 
on the Sanchez case and its aftermath, this Part investigates Hawai‘i Puerto 
Ricans’ fight for U.S. citizenship—both its attainment and the realization of  
the supposed benefits of  that citizenship—in the face of  laws and policies 
that legitimized unequal treatment for laborers of  color. As described below, 
while Olivieri Sánchez and the Puerto Rican community achieved a measure 
of  justice in Sanchez, they were keenly aware of  the law’s conflicting ability to 
oppress and liberate. Part V concludes. 
II. PUERTO RICANS IN HAWAI‘I: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
When the first group of  Puerto Ricans arrived in Hawai‘i in 1900 (Carr 
1989, 61),5 Westerners controlled nearly all aspects of  Hawai‘i’s economic 
and political life (Fuchs 1961, 152– 53). In the mid-1800s, Europeans and 
Americans acquired vast tracts of  land when Native Hawaiian communal land 
tenure was converted into a Western private property system (MacKenzie, 
Serrano and Sproat 2015, 12–16; Osorio 2002, 44–50). Native Hawaiian lands 
were divided, confiscated, sold away. Plantations diverted water from agrarian 
Hawaiian communities (MacKenzie, Serrano and Sproat 2015, 532; Sproat 
2010, 189). Native Hawaiians were separated from the land, thereby severing 
cultural and spiritual connections (MacKenzie, Serrano and Sproat 2015, 784; 
Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 25–29, 305). 
Private land ownership and the Reciprocity Treaty of  1875—which lifted 
t ariffs on Hawaiʻi-grown sugar exported to the United States—paved the 
way for massive sugar plantations and impending U.S. control (Van Dyke 
2008, 118–20, 155). Following the illegal overthrow of  the Hawaiian nation 
in 1893, American military and plantation owners lobbied hard for Hawai‘i’s 
annexation to the United States. With a military base at Pearl Harbor and sugar 
at stake, the United States annexed Hawai‘i in 1898 and took control of  the 
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provisional government as well as all former Hawaiian government and royal 
lands (Serrano et al. 2007, 205, 208).
Desperate for cheap labor to support large-scale sugar production, planters 
began importing “plodding Chinese coolie[s]” under low-wage contracts 
(Third Report 1905, 62; Beechert 1985, 37–41, 59–60, 62–63; Takaki 1983, 22). 
To induce competition and racial divisions between workers, the sugar planters 
shipped in laborers from Japan and Portugal, and later, from Korea, Puerto 
Rico, the Philippines, and even the U.S. South (Lind 1990, 4). Important to this 
enterprise was the Westerners’ belief  in their racial superiority and “the notion 
that the white race could not perform labor under the difficult conditions of  
tropical and subtropical plantations” (Beechert 1985, 40). Plantation owners 
used physical force and tight economic control to dominate these workers of  
color (Takaki 1983, 66–75). The stage was set for what would become a highly 
racially stratified plantation system throughout the 1900s (Takaki 1983, 76). 
At the same time, debates swirled over the United States’ new “imperial” 
role and how to handle the “racially inferior people inhabiting the conquered 
areas” (Perea 2001, 141).6 Decision-makers warned against bestowing 
constitutional guarantees upon the “ignorant” and “half-civilized” peoples of  
Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Even those who supported “an honorable 
and fruitful association” with Puerto Rico “accept[ed] the proposition that the 
United States could not and would not ‘incorporate the alien races, [or the] 
civilized, semi-civilized, barbarous, and savage peoples of  [the] islands into [the 
U.S.] body politic’” (Cabranes 1978, 432—citing 33 Cong. Rec. 3622 (1900); 
Malavet 2004; Rivera Ramos 1996, 2001; Román 2006). In the infamous 
Insular Cases, t he U.S. Supreme Court worried that Puerto Rico’s “racially 
different others” threatened the very heart of  white Anglo-Saxon dominance 
(Perea 2001, 158): Justice Brown’s opinion in Downes v. Bidwell warned that the 
offspring of  the colonies’ inhabitants, “whether savages or civilized,” would be 
“entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of  citizens” (1901, 279). 
Race was also key in legitimizing the Hawai‘i sugar oligarchy’s confiscation 
of  land and exploitation of  laborers of  color fr om around the globe (Beechert 
1985, 40–41). While the sugar planters “used race to legitimize conquest, 
denigrating, in racial terms, those colonized” (Yamamoto and Betts 2008,  
558—citing Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and The Colonized), they also sought 
to civilize those colonial people “through the acquisition of  [W]estern values 
and work discipline” (Beechert 1985,40—citing  Kuykendall 1938, 171). At that 
time, cheap labor was in desperate demand: Hawai‘i’s annexation to the United 
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States halted the importation of  Chinese and alien contract laborers,7 and 
Japanese were considered overly “demanding” (Takaki 1983, 150–51; Porto 
Ricans Arrive 1900, 1). The planters thus found a solution in “Porto Ricans 
and . .  . Negroes from the Southern States” (Report of  the Commissioner of  
Labor on Hawaii  1902, 19; see also Reports of  the Immigration Commission 
1911, 702). With false promises of  high wages, plantation own ers recruited 
Puerto Ricans to work as cheap labor and strikebreakers (Report of  the 
Commissioner 1902, 32; Porto Ricans to be Imported 1900; Carr 1987, 103). 
About 5,000 Puerto Ricans arrived in Hawai‘i between 1900 and 1901 (Carr 
1987 , 102).
The powerful white plantation oligarchy easily exploited Puerto Rican 
laborers because of  their ambiguous citizenship status. The Treaty of  Paris 
between the United States and Spain, which ended the Spanish-American War 
in 1898, did not confer citizenship on the “native inhabitants” of  Puerto Rico 
(Treaty of  Peace 1898, 1759), and the 1900 Foraker Act establishing a civil 
government for Puerto Rico described them as “citizens of  Porto Rico”—not 
citizens of  the United States (Foraker Act 1900; Torruella 2008, 14). In 1904, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that Puerto Ricans were not “alien 
immigrants” and could not be barred from entering the United States, but they 
were not U.S. citizens, either (Gonzales v. Williams 1904, 12; Burnett 2008, 661). 
This ambiguity in citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges gave 
authorities license to treat Puerto Ricans arbitrarily, and oftentimes, unfairly 
(Burnett 2008, 689–91; Venator Santiago 2001). As early as 1900, Puerto Rican 
workers bound for Hawai‘i entered the United States through New Orleans 
as if  they were citizens—with the help of  a special immigration official sent 
to facilitate the process (Porto Ricans Classed As American Citizens 1900; 
To Enter Hawaii 1900; Carr 1987, 97). On the plantation, on the other hand, 
Puerto Ricans’ “place in the occupation hierarchy was determined by the 
fact that they were not citizens of  America, [even though] they were from an 
American possession” (Camacho Souza 1984, 168). At the same time, because 
they were not “aliens,” Puerto Rican laborers did not have representatives 
from their homeland to advocate for their rights, as other laborers did (Porto 
Rican Petition 1904, 3). 
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The Hawai‘i Republican Territorial Committee immediately asked the Territory Attorney 
General to determine whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens entitled to vote.
Hawai‘i’s sugar planters also sought to ensure that Puerto Ricans did 
not have the same rights as U.S. citizens. In 1902, only two years after the 
first group arrived, sixty Puerto Rican laborers sent a petition to the San Juan 
News chronicling widespread mistreatment by sugar planters and police in 
the Territory of  Hawai‘i (Carr 1989, 187). The Hawai‘i Republican Territorial 
Committee immediately asked the Territory Attorney General to determine 
whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens entitled to vote. The Committee was 
alarmed that “if  [Puerto Ricans] were allowed to vote it would . . . introduce[] 
a new element into the political situation of  the Hawaiian Islands of  a rather 
uncertain quality” (No Right to Vote 1902, 3).8 The Attorney General, of  
course, determined that Puerto Ricans were not U.S. citizens and thus had no 
right to vote in Hawai‘i Territory. Because citizenship was an “indispensable 
qualification for the suffrage in [Hawai‘i] Territory,” the Attorney General 
wrote, “[i]t follows that Porto Ricans cannot vote here without being first 
naturalized” (1902, 3). 
To justify its treatment of  Puerto Ricans as unworthy of  participating 
in the polity, Hawai‘i’s sugar oligarchy strategically characterized them as 
uncivilized and inferior (Carr 1987, 102; McGreevey 2008, 59). Plantation-
controlled news accounts and U.S. and Hawai‘i government reports depicted 
Puerto Rican laborers alternatively as “squalid” and “piteous,” “indolent” and 
“shiftless,” “unruly” and “treacherous,” or “happy” and “contented” (Serrano 
2011, 58). U.S. decision-makers had already deployed some of  these depictions 
to bolster the United States’ conquest of  Puerto Rico, and U.S. agribusiness 
and Hawai‘i’s government spread these images to destabilize and dehumanize 
Puerto Ricans as a means of  controlling and suppressing labor.9
Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i were thus acutely aware from the start that 
Hawai‘i’s legal system reflected the interests and values of  those most 
powerful. But, as discussed below, they invoked legal doctrine and the 
language of  “rights” to pursue their justice claims to citizenship, and later their 
claims to the rights attendant to that citizenship—because those claims held 
transformative potential. The law, for them, could both sanction oppression 
and also provide openings to liberation. 
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III. “DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS” ABOUT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS
The awareness of  this tension between the law’s ability to oppress and liberate 
developed partially as critical race theory’s response to critical legal studies.10 
Critical legal studies scholars in the 1970s and 1980s deconstructed formalist 
methods of  legal analysis and understandings of  law as inherently neutral and 
objective (Kennedy 1976, 1983; Gabel 1980, 1984; Gabel and Kennedy 1984; 
Matsuda 1987, 324–32). Taking their cue from the legal realist movement as well 
as poststructuralism and postmodernism, critical legal scholars demonstrated 
that the law is indeterminate, contradictory and politically charged; and that 
legal decision-making is deeply influenced by judges’ ideological views, history, 
and political conditions (Gordon 1984; Hutchinson and Monahan 1984; 
Singer 1984; Tushnet 1984, 1986; Unger 1983).
Employing the deconstruction methodology of  theorists such as Derrida 
and Foucault, critical legal scholars exposed how the law maintains hierarchies, 
particularly those regarding class (Boyle 1992). They contended that legal 
language tends to mask politics and reflect the interests of  those in power, and 
that the law’s images and technical language operate to convince people that 
legal arrangements are natural and inevitable. 
Critical legal scholars also maintained that the rhetoric of  liberalism 
and the seductiveness of  “rights” deceives oppressed groups, resulting in a 
“false consciousness” about the fairness of  the legal system (Tushnet 1984, 
1385–86). According to Marxist thought, members of  subordinate classes 
suffer from false consciousness—they are unable to see the ways in which 
surrounding social relations of  production conceal the realities of  exploitation 
and domination embodied in those social relations (Eyerman 1981, 44). In 
the legal setting, critical legal studies scholars employed the concept of  false 
consciousness to mean that liberalism’s claims of  equality and fairness have 
duped subordinated groups into blindly accepting an oppressive legal system 
(Cook 1990, 992). 
Thus, many critical legal scholars “trashed” rights-based approaches 
to equality. They argued that rights are malleable, offer artificial hope, and 
alienate people from each other (Hutchinson 2003, 632). As a result, critical 
legal scholars claimed that individuals and groups “should abandon a rights-
centered approach to social justice, replacing it with more informal, often 
undefined, mechanisms for the attainment of  justice” (Hutchinson 2005, 21; 
2002, 1476–78).
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Despite its pathbreaking insights, critical legal studies was challenged as 
elitist, overwhelmingly white, and disconnected from the concrete struggles 
of  ordinary communities (Sproat 2011, 163—citing  Matsuda 1987, 342-46). It 
also failed to fully resonate with marginalized groups who were acutely aware 
of  the law’s ability to subordinate, but who also refused to wholly abandon the 
legal system because of  its potential to uplift and liberate in certain contexts 
(Delgado 1987, 307–08).
But for critical race theorists, critical legal studies lacked an understanding of  the role of  
race and racism in both the U.S. legal system and in society itself.
Critical race theorists in the 1980s embraced many of  the methodologies 
and insights of  critical legal studies. They shared, for example, critical legal 
scholars’ insights about the law’s indeterminacy, lack of  neutrality, and 
reinforcement of  hierarchical social relations. But for critical race theorists, 
critical legal studies lacked an understanding of  the role of  race and racism in 
both the U.S. legal system and in society itself. Because critical race theorists 
found value in civil rights discourse (while acknowledging its limitations), they 
critiqued critical legal studies’ excessively pessimistic views about the prospects 
for social change through law (Yamamoto n.d. 37–38). 
 Also drawing from philosophers and theorists such as Gramsci, Foucault, 
and Derrida (see Gramsci 1971), critical race theorists exposed the “legal 
manifestations of  white supremacy and the perpetuation of  the subordination 
of  people of  color” (Delgado 1995; Crenshaw et al. 1995). In challenging 
the efficacy of  both liberal legal theory and communitarian ideals as vehicles 
for racial progress, they “traced racism in American law to the birth of  the 
American legal system, and found it to be an integral part of  the system, rather 
than a minor aberration” (Wing 2009, 51). Thus, they illuminated how the “law 
ignores cultural domination within [its] own processes and the ways in which 
those processes contribute to racial oppression” (Yamamoto  1997, 868). 
Critical race theorists therefore offered scholarship and discourse that “looks 
to the bottom”—to the experiences of  the most oppressed—to contextualize 
and give meaning to their theory (Matsuda 1987). 
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Drawing from complex litigation experiences, critical race theorists 
also embraced W.E.B. Du Bois’ concept of  “double consciousness,” which 
describes the way in which African Americans held two perspectives at once—
the majority perspective (which demonized and despised them) as well as their 
own. According to Du Bois:
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of  always looking 
at one’s self  through the eyes of  others, of  measuring one’s soul by the tape of  a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring 
ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.  
(DuBois 2007, 8)
Frantz Fanon similarly describes how Black colonial subjects experience a deep 
sense of  inferiority rooted in their divided perception of  the world:
Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of  reference within which he has 
had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the 
sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a 
civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself  on him. (Fanon 1967, 110)11 
For critical race theorists, this duality laid a foundation for understanding 
oppressed groups’ limited but compelling legal and political challenges 
to existing social arrangements (Yamamoto n.d., 7). As legal scholar Mari 
Matsuda contends, this duality gives subordinated people strength: “[a]
pplying the double consciousness con[c]ept to rights rhetoric allows us to see 
that the victim of  racism can have a mainstream consciousness . . . as well 
as a victim’s consciousness. These two viewpoints can combine powerfully 
to create a radical constitutionalism that is true to the radical roots of  this 
country” (198 7, 333–34).12 
Critical race theorists therefore maintain that oppressed groups can have 
a profound cynicism about law and legal process while acknowledging the 
historical and social role that rights have played in both liberating (even if  
imperfectly) and elevatin g the psyche of  subordinated groups (Hutchinson 
2003, 623). Rather than a mere “false consciousness,” critical race scholars 
contend that marginalized groups possess a “critical consciousness”: the 
subordinated can both “understand subordination and derive means of  
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liberation from it” (Matsuda 1990, 1778; see also Delgado 1987, 312). Critical 
race scholars thus recognize that the dual consciousness of  those at the 
bottom accommodates the concept of  legal indeterminacy alongside “the core 
belief  in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy” (Matsuda 19 87, 341; 
see also Barnes 1990, 1864–65). 
In the context of  Japanese Americans’ struggles for reparations for World 
War II internment, Matsuda contends that Japanese Americans embraced this 
dual consciousness by simultaneously protesting against illegal government 
actions while embracing and transforming America’s seminal text, the 
Constitution. According to Matsuda, “[i]f  trust in the Constitution sustains 
Japanese-Americans in their uphill battle against racist oppression, then the 
Constitution for them has become a radical document” (1987, 340). Even if  
their efforts fail in the courtroom, “[t]heir consciousness . . . of  the ultimate 
legitimacy of  their fight against racism allows them to hold unpopular and 
ultimately transformative opinions with confidence, and to risk retribution 
from powerful opponents” (1987, 340–41).13 
For these reasons, critical race theorists underscore the importance of  
right s assertion for oppressed peoples and communities of  color. While critical 
race theorists similarly maintain that rights are malleable and can lead to false 
consciousness, they depart from  the critical legal studies approach because, for 
them, rights can be a vehicle to compel powerful white actors and institutions 
to recognize disempowered people’s dignity. In rejecting rights, they argue, 
critical legal scholars not only failed to “analyze the hegemonic role of  racism” 
(Crenshaw 1988, 1356), but also “ignore[d] the degree to which rights-assertion 
and the benefits of  rights [sometimes] have helped” subordinated groups 
(Yamamoto n.d., 38; see also Williams 1987, 405). Critical race theorists thus 
viewed critical legal studies’ “rights trashing” as divorced from communities’ 
complex experiences with law and legal process (Yamamoto 1992, 239). 
Drawing from the African American historical experience, legal scholar 
Patricia Williams illuminates the seeming dissonance between African 
Americans’ disbelief  in and passionate embrace of  rights. She acknowledges 
that rights were “shaped by whites, parcelled out to blacks in pieces, ordained 
in small favors, as random insulting gratuities” (Williams 1987, 430). But “the 
recursive insistence of  those rights is also defined by black desire for them, 
desire not fueled by the sop of  minor enforcement of  major statutory schemes 
like the Civil Rights Act, but by knowledge of, and generations of  existing 
in, a world without any meaningful boundaries” (1987, 431).14 For African 
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Ameri cans, rights provide a sense of  definition, a familiar vision, a “sign 
for and a gift of  selfhood” (1987, 431). As Williams asserts, “[t]he concept 
of  rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of  our citizenship, our 
participatoriness, our relation to others” (1987, 431). Rights are also crucial to 
mobilizing support for a particular agenda as part of  a larger social movement 
(Calmore 1992, 2214). Thus, for disempowered groups, “the conferring of  
rights is symbolic of  all the denied aspects of  their humanity: rights imply a 
respect that places one in the referential range of  self  and others, that elevates 
one’s status from human body to social being” (Williams 1991, 153).
Therefore, as legal scholar Angela Harris explains, critical race theorists 
do not wholly embrace modernist principles because “the old optimistic faith 
in reason, truth, blind justice, and neutrality, have not brought us to racial 
justice, but have rather left us ‘stirring the ashes”’ (Harris 1994, 759). On the 
other hand, they do not totally embrace postmodernism because “faith in 
reason and truth and belief  in the essential freedom of  rational subjects have 
enabled people of  color to survive and resist subordination” (1994, 753).15 For 
critical race theorists, then, the aim is to inhabit this tension (1994, 760). This 
double consciousness—the simultaneous acknowledgment of  the oppressive 
effect of  differential power in the enforcement of  law, and the value in rights 
discourse and legal claims even if  they may fail (Yamamoto n.d., 38)—is, 
therefore, a source of  strength. 
As described below, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans also possessed a critical 
consciousness: they both comprehended subordination and derived methods 
of  liberation from it. They possessed a deep distrust of  law and legal process, 
stemming from their lived experience on Hawai‘i’s sugar plantations. At the 
same time, they saw the important role that the fight for U.S. citizenship—and 
the rights attendant to that citizenship—played to compel powerful actors and 
institutions to recognize their humanity and dignity. 
IV. PUERTO RICANS’ DUAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans were uniquely situated among the racial groups on 
Hawai‘i’s sugar plantations. While they experienced oppression in common 
with other racial communities, they also faced particular hardships because 
they inhabited an undefined space between citizen and alien. From this vantage 
point, they grappled with the subordinating effects of  law, but they also 
embraced the American promises of  “rights” and “justice.” And, as discussed 
below, the Sanchez case provided an opening for Puerto Ricans to compel 
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enforcement of  their rights and secure a measure of  legal equality. Even after 
obtaining U.S. citizenship, however, Puerto Ricans knew that freedom from 
discriminatory treatment would not come easily. 
A. Life on the Sugar Plantation: The Subordinating Effects of Law
Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i learned very early that the white plantation oligarchy 
wielded inordinate power over Hawai‘i’s legal, political and economic systems. 
Five former missionary families-turned-multinational corporations, known 
as “The Big Five,” spun their “web of  control” over nearly every facet of  life, 
from banking and shipping to the courts and governmental decision-making 
(Fuchs 1961, 152–53; Cooper and Daws 1990, 3; Kent 1993, 69–81). The 
Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA), controlled by the Big Five, exerted 
considerable direct influence over the growth of  agribusiness in the United 
States, helping to transform agriculture from small farms into multi-national 
corporate-controlled “big business” (Cooper and Daws 1990, 208–13; ; Kent 
1993, 104–09). 
When a number of  Puerto Rican laborers left their plantation because they were “whipped 
and maltreated,” a Spanish interpreter used by the police labeled them “a rather lazy and 
worthless lot . . . a sort of  floating, shiftless element . . . inclined to be lazy.”
To further Hawai‘i’s agribusiness trade, plantation owners had to exert 
control over recalcitrant workers. Working in conjunction with local authorities, 
sugar planters used vagrancy laws to maintain order on the plantations and 
to capture and selectively criminalize “deserters” (Takaki 1983, 72; Merry 
2000, 187). When Puerto Ricans left their assigned plantations because of  
maltreatment or lack of  services (Beechert 1985, 130), the sugar planters 
and territorial authorities characterized Puerto Ricans as lazy “vagrants” and 
began rounding them up for that reason. One news article, “City Full of  
Beggars,” explained how the Puerto Rican had “a desire to get something for 
nothing” (1901, 6). Another warned that “the town was infested with Porto 
Rican idlers” (J.A. M’Candless 1901, 15.). Yet another decried “The Lazy and 
Thriftless Porto Rican” (Ride To Work in Hacks 1901, 14; see also Poor Labor 
Proposition  1901, 7). When a number of  Puerto Rican laborers left their 
plantation because they were “whipped and maltreated,” a Spanish interpreter 
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used by the police labeled them “a rather lazy and worthless lot .  . . a sort of  
floating, shiftless element . . . inclined to be lazy” (Hidalgos Out  1901, 14). 
One prominent member of  society called Puerto Ricans “a bad lot, taken as a 
whole,” “indolent,” “unruly and mean”; a potential source of  “serious trouble 
in Hawaii” (Davis 1901, 1). 
Other Puerto Ricans who moved to more humane plantations were 
also rebuked by the sugar planter-dominated newspapers, which “branded 
those hard-working l aborers who moved from one plantation to another as 
‘irresponsible’ and . . . ‘lazy” (López 2005, 47). As a result, the HSPA passed 
a resolution that forbade Puerto Ricans—and only Puerto Ricans—from 
obtaining work without HSPA permission or an honorable discharge from the 
plantation from which they left (Beechert 1985, 131).
A U.S. Labor Commissioner report echoed these negative characterizations. 
It explained that, because the Puerto Ricans were “ morally upset by their long 
travels and changed environment” and could not “adapt themselves to any sort 
of  an industrious life,” many became “strollers and vagabonds” and drifted into 
the towns to “form a class of  malcontents and petty criminals” (Report of  the 
Commissioner, 1901, 26).16 The “boss” of  the O‘ahu jail attributed this new 
“evil” to the Puerto Ricans’ inherent nature: “The evil of  vagrancy is growing in 
the community, owing perhaps to the character of  our new population” (Hard 
Times 1901, 5). Casting Puerto Ricans as vagrants implied that they needed 
discipline and that the plantation was the place to supply it.
For the sugar planters and territorial authorities, Puerto Ricans’ “vagrancy” 
was not only bothersome—it was criminal. A jail boss explained, “I think it is a 
good idea to deal with [vagrancy] severely. The Porto Ricans who are in [jail] now 
and at wo rk in the crusher are likely to be very careful how they lay themselves 
liable to capture again” (Hard Times 1901, 5; see also Vagrants Pleaded Guilty 
1901, 5). One news article reported that “[t]here are quite a number of  Porto 
Ricans now serving heavy sentences of  imprisonment for vagrancy” (Few Porto 
Ricans 1904, 1). It proclaimed that “the city has been pretty well cleared of  Porto 
Rican loafers. By following the custom of  arresting Porto Ricans who were 
without employment[] and . . . [sentencing them] to terms of  imprisonment[,] 
the police have succeeded in clearing the city of  very disreputable characters” 
(1904, 1). A court interpreter warned of  Puerto Ricans’ criminal nature: “The y 
are vindictive and treacherous; they never forget, and sooner or later they will 
probably find a chance to get back at the one who injured them, and it will 
probably be by a stab from behind” (Hidalgos Out 1901, 14; see also López 
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2000, 45).
Hawai‘i’s sugar oligarchy used these so-called criminal characteristics of  
Puerto Ricans to justify its often indiscriminate round up and imprisonment of  
Puerto Ricans. After a Puerto Rican man, José Miranda,17 allegedly murdered a 
prominent white missionary descendant, law enforcement officials were ordered 
to “round up every Porto Rican who [was] not working” (The Law Moves 1904, 
1, 5). During the first sweep, eleven individuals—both men and women—were 
arrested as a “result of  a crusade” to find the murderer (After the Vagrants 1905, 
5; Porto Rican Vags 1904, 1). Thus, although only one Puerto Rican man was 
accused and convicted of  murder, and even though many Puerto Ricans were 
simply trying to escape harsh plantation conditions for a better life, all Puerto 
Ricans were targets of  accusation and effectively cast as lawbreakers.
They contended, among other things, that other racial groups’ rights were valued, but that 
they were “unprotected” in their American “home.”
Employing the language of  rights, Puerto Ricans resisted in ways big 
and small. In 1904, Puerto Rican laborers sent a petition to the Territorial 
Governor calling for an investigation into their inhumane treatment on a 
plantation on the island of  Kaua‘i. They contended, among other things, that 
other racial groups’ rights were valued, but that they were “unprotected” in 
their American “home.” At the same time, they fought for the enforcement of  
their rights, and demanded “justice” for the wrongs done to them:
. . . In this country, the subjects of  Portugal, of  Japan, and 
China . . . have one to represent them as Consul who sees to and investi-
gates their complaints, and fi ghts for their rights.
We Porto Ricans only (although we call this American country 
“our home”) form or constitute an exceptionally rare and very painful 
exception. We are denied almost everything[.]
. . . [W]e are not ignorant of  our duties and of  our rights, com-
plying with the former and resolved to have the latter respected, for the 
fl ag which fl oats over our heads is a guaranty for our future. 
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They questioned why Puerto Ricans were singled out for harsh treatment 
based on the actions of  a few:
Sir, while it is beyond a doubt true that not a few of  our fellow 
countrymen, who have come to this country, have by their vicious habits 
and bad conduct prejudiced others against them . . . and that our jails are 
fi lled with Porto Ricans is also true. . . . Is it possible that we Porto Ricans 
are treated all alike and that no distinction is made? Such, we are sorry to 
say, has been the custom among the managers of  plantations. 
They protested the inhumane working and living conditions on the 
plantation and “demand[ed] justice”:
. . . In this plantation (Kekaha) there is a movement in course 
of  progress which is unqualifi edly inhuman, to which movement we 
energetically protest, denouncing it, within the limits of  our perfect right 
to the prime gubernatorial authority of  this Territory . . .
. . . [O]thers among us, though suffering are working as much 
as they can, and others are living on charity coming from our fellow coun-
trymen. No aid whatsoever is given by the plantation, nothing more than 
the small and poor habitations where we are sheltered. This situation, 
Honorable Sir, is terrible without our being able to remedy it. . . .
What then, Sir, are we to do? Is there any other course left to 
us than, by means of  this missive to appeal to you and demand justice? 
(Porto Rican Petition  1904, 3; see also Kauai Has 1904, 5).
The plantation and Hawai‘i officials investigated and rejected the petition, 
finding that the plantation managers and overseers “were kind and good 
to them,” and that the Puerto Ricans on that plantation were “contented” 
(Kekaha Porto Ricans  1904, 2). 
As this early petition suggests, because they were a “rare and very painful 
exception,” Puerto Ricans were acutely aware of  the law’s ability to subordinate. 
They were jailed at a disproportionate rate, offered “nothing more than . . . 
small and poor habitations,” and had no representative to “fight[] for their 
rights.” At the same time, they refused to wholly abandon the legal system 
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because of  its potential to uplift and liberate in certain contexts. For them, 
the American promise of  rights under law was a “guaranty of  [their] future.” 
The Sanchez v. Kalauokalani case, discussed below, and its affirmation of  U.S. 
citizenship for Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans reflects Puerto Ricans’ understanding 
that even though the law could often be subordinating, it could at times 
provide small openings toward justice. 
B. Sanchez v. Kalauokalani and U.S. Citizenship: 
A Transformative View of Law
Indeed, in 1917, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans turned to the same courts that had 
historically denied their rights to full participation. In Hawai‘i, as elsewhere, 
their turn to the courts can be explained in part by their desire for the full 
participatory selfhood that rights elicit; they, like others, while recognizing the 
sharp limits of  the law, embraced a transformative vision of  law as a vehicle to 
validate their place in the U.S. polity. Their fight for U.S. citizenship in Sanchez 
v. Kalauokalani offered that transformative potential. 
In April 1917, about one month after the enactment of  the Jones Act, 
Manuel Olivieri Sánchez, a Puerto Rican former plantation laborer-turned-
court reporter residing in the Territory of  Hawai‘i, attempted to register 
to vote in the local Hawai‘i elections. The clerk of  the city and county of  
Honolulu, David Kalauokalani, refused to register Olivieri Sánchez, “claiming 
that [Olivieri Sánchez] was not and is not a citizen of  the United States and 
therefore not entitled to register as a voter” (Sanchez v. Kalauokalani 1917, 22). 
Olivieri Sánchez took the case to court. Represented by a small law office, 
he filed a petition for writ of  mandamus to direct the clerk to place his name 
on the voting register (Petition for Writ of  Mandamus 1917, 3). At the same 
time, he rallied other fellow Puerto Ricans to refuse the draft—to which they 
had recently become eligible as U.S. citizens—if  they were not allowed to vote 
(Carr 1987, 101). Olivieri Sánchez contended that the clerk wrongfully refused 
to put his name on the great register of  electors because, under the Foraker 
and Jones Acts, Olivieri Sánchez was a citizen of  the United States (Petition 
for Writ of  Mandamus 1917, 2). To support his argument, he declared that 
he was born in Yauco, Puerto Rico, in 1888, that his parents became “citizens 
of  Porto Rico” under the Foraker Act and did not “elect to retain allegiance 
to the crown of  Spain,” and that he and his mother had arrived in Hawai‘i 
Territory in September 1901 when he was thirteen years old (Petition for Writ 
of  Mandamus 1917, 1; Sanchez 1917, 23).18  Thus, he contended, upon passage 
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of  the Jones Act, which collectively naturalized all “citizens of  Puerto Rico,” 
he, too, became a U.S. citizen.
In response, Kalauokalani argued that because the Foraker and Jones 
Acts established a body politic for the government of  Puerto Rico, the Jones 
Act did not apply to Olivieri Sánchez: the Act was “not intended to apply to 
persons who, at the date thereof, had ceased to be residents of  Porto Rico and 
had acquired a permanent residence elsewhere” (Kalauokalani  1917, 4). 
First Circuit Court Judge S.B. Kemp ruled for Kalauokalani. Looking first 
to the Foraker Act, the court explained that in order to determine whether 
Olivieri Sánchez “was on April 11, 1917, the time he sought to register as an 
elector, a citizen of  the United States,” it needed to determine “whether or 
not on or prior to March 2, 1917, he was a citizen of  Porto Rico as defined by 
Section 7 of  the Act of  April 12, 1900” (First Circuit Court Decision 1917, 5). 
According to Judge Kemp, Olivieri Sánchez did become “a citizen of  Porto 
Rico, not having elected to retain his allegiance to the Crown of  Spain” (First 
Circuit Court Decision 1917, 5).
However, wrote Judge Kemp, Olivieri Sánchez’s removal from Puerto 
Rico and establishment of  a permanent residence in Hawai‘i altered his status 
as a citizen of  Puerto Rico. Equating Puerto Rican citizenship with state 
citizenship, the court declared that “when [Olivieri Sánchez] left Porto Rico in 
1901, with no intention of  returning . . . he thereby automatically ceased to be 
a citizen of  Porto Rico, and was not on March 2nd, 1917, such citizen of  Porto 
Rico, and therefore did not become by the terms of  that Act a citizen of  the 
United States” (First Circuit Court Decision 1917, 7). Without pointing to any 
legislative history or direct legal authority, the court concluded that Congress 
intended to make Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens “so long as they remained 
inhabitants of  Porto Rico, giving them thereby a citizenship anal[o]gous to 
State citizenship as distinguished from National citizenship which would be 
lost by removal from Porto Rico” (First Circuit Court Decision 1917, 7).19
The impact was immediately felt. In the media, Olivieri Sánchez’s attorney 
contended that the court’s decision “place[d] the Porto Rican who is not in 
Porto Rico in a serious situation. . . . He is a citizen of  no country. He is not 
a citizen of  Porto Rico and he is not a citizen of  the United States” (Porto 
Ricans Here 1917, 2.; see also Porto Ricans of  Hawaii  1917, 1). According 
to a major Hawai‘i newspaper, the decision “affect[ed] the status of  between 
500 and 700 Puerto Ricans who had hoped to be able to exercise the right of  
franchise at the coming primary and general elections in the Territory” (Porto 
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Ricans Here 1917, 7). Olivieri Sánchez and his attorneys gathered delegations 
of  Puerto Ricans from all of  the major Hawaiian islands to decide whether to 
appeal, and to enlist fi nancial support from other Puerto Ricans throughout 
the Territory (Porto Rcans Here 1917; Porto Ricans of  Hawaii 1917, 1).
In response, Kalauokalani contended that Olivieri Sánchez “continued to be an American 
subject, but ceased to be a citizen of  Porto Rico as soon as the permanent residence in 
Hawaii began.”
On appeal, Olivieri Sánchez again argued that he was a U.S. citizen based 
on the plain language of  the Foraker and Jones Acts. In response, Kalauokalani 
contended that Olivieri Sánchez “continued to be an American subject, but 
ceased to be a citizen of  Porto Rico as soon as the permanent residence 
in Hawaii began” (Brief  for Appellee 1917, 17). Echoing the paternalistic 
arguments of  many decision-makers of  the time, he contended that Olivieri 
Sánchez was not the type of  Puerto Rican slated for U.S. citizenship by the 
Jones Act: 
A new people was to be trained in the art of  self-government. Those who 
continued to reside in the islands could take part in this self-government. 
Those who left, must shift for themselves. . . . After seventeen years of  
self-government these ‘youths’ in popular government were made full 
fl edged citizens of  the republic. Those who had ceased to reside in Porto 
Rico were not in the mind of  Congress which focused its attention upon 
the youthful Territory of  Porto Rico and its inhabitants. (1917, 17–18) 
In other words, argued Kalauokalani, Olivieri Sánchez “did not attend the 
‘Porto Rican School of  training in popular government’ as to which Congress 
legislated in 1900 and 1917. Not knowing the circumstances or condition or 
training of  those who left the Island, Congress was silent as to their status 
other than the status of  ‘American Subjects’ acquired by the treaty[.]” (1917, 
19). In the end, neither party could point to relevant case law in support of  
their arguments, but instead referenced inapposite cases such as Gonzales v. 
Williams, a 1904 U.S. Supreme Court case that determined that “citizens of  
Porto Rico” were neither citizens nor aliens (1904, 12).
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In October 1917, the Supreme Court of  the Territory of  Hawai‘i reversed 
the lower court. It unanimously held that Olivieri Sánchez became a U.S. 
citizen pursuant to the Jones Act even though he had moved to Hawai‘i in 
1901. According to the court, one need look only to the language of  the Treaty 
of  Paris and the Foraker and Jones Acts: on April 12, 1900, the expiration 
of  one year from the ratification of  the Treaty of  Paris, Olivieri Sánchez’s 
political status “was fixed.” He and his father “were on April 11, 1899, Spanish 
subjects and they resided in Porto Rico; they remained in Porto Rico until the 
expiration of  the year and elected to renounce their Spanish allegiance and 
adopt the nationality of  the United States, and thereby became citizens of  
Porto Rico” as defined by the Foraker Act (Sanchez 1917, 27).
Therefore, up until the time that Olivieri Sánchez left Puerto Rico and 
moved to Hawai‘i, there was no change in his political status: “he was then a 
citizen of  Porto Rico, and at all times since April 12, 1900, the petitioner has 
been a subject of  the United States and was not a Spanish subject, and this 
political status existed at the time of  the enactment and taking effect of  the 
act of  Congress of  March 2, 1917” (1917, 27). As such, the court concluded 
that “[t]here is nothing in the [Jones] act showing an intent to exclude from its 
operation persons who are . . . citizens of  Porto Rico, but who were at the date 
of  the act of  March 2, 1917, absent from Porto Rico” (1917, 27).
Importantly, according to the court, the Jones Act’s language, “‘are hereby 
declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, citizens of  the United States’ . . . 
shows the intent to immediately invest citizens of  Porto Rico with United States 
citizenship, and there is no claim that the petitioner ever exercised the option (if  
it was given him) to reject the citizenship conferred by the act, but the contrary 
does appear” (1917, 28). The court therefore held that “by virtue of  the . . . 
act of  Congress of  March 2, 1917, the petitioner became a full-fledged citizen 
of  the United States at the time that the said act went into effect[.]” (1917, 28). 
Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans celebrated this significant legal victory.20
Thus, while often questioning law’s efficacy to remedy the “inhuman[e]” 
treatment on the plantations, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans “passionately invoke[d] 
legal doctrine [and] legal ideals” (Matsuda 1987, 338) in their quest for U.S. 
citizenship. Indeed, Sanchez represents their fight for formal recognition as 
members of  the U.S. polity—their quest for a sense of  definition, a marker of  
their “participatoriness” (Williams 1987, 431). At the same time, as discussed 
below, they pursued their claims knowing that the plantation laws still controlled 
much of  their daily lives and that mere possession of  formal U.S. citizenship 
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would not automatically transform their treatment or status in society. They 
continued to protest laws that governed the territory for that reason. 
C. Sanchez’s Aftermath: The Law’s Confl icting Capacity Simultaneously to 
Oppress and Open Paths Toward Liberation
As newly recognized U.S. citizens, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans obtained the 
right to vote in Hawai‘i elections, but because of  their numbers, still held 
little political clout. They also experienced some economic benefit, such as 
eligibility for defense industry jobs (particularly at Pearl Harbor) and increased 
job opportunity and mobility (Carr 1987, 101; López 2005, 47).21 And for 
some, U.S. citizenship also contributed to a sense that, notwithstanding the 
challenges, Hawai‘i would become their permanent home.
For many, however, the acquisition of  U.S. citizenship changed little about 
their treatment. In many instances, Puerto Ricans were pitted against other 
racial groups on the plantations, were targeted by plantation and governmental 
authorities, and faced discrimination in broader Hawai‘i society.
For this reason, as illustrated below, Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i possessed a 
critical consciousness—they understood oppression and “derive[d] means of  
liberation from it” (Matsuda 1990, 1778). In the face of  ongoing derogatory 
treatment, even as U.S. citizens, “[t]heir consciousness . . . of  the ultimate 
legitimacy of  their fight” permitted them to hold “unpopular and ultimately 
transformative opinions with confidence, and to risk retribution from 
powerful opponents” (Matsuda 1987, 340–41). Through grassroots and media 
advocacy, they called on authorities to remedy deprivations of  their liberty and 
to extend basic human rights on the plantations, all while acknowledging that 
they would not easily escape unjust treatment or damaging characterizations as 
“lawbreakers” and “illiterates.”
 For example, in 1919, two years after becoming U.S. citizens, a 
group of  Puerto Ricans sent a detailed petition to the Puerto Rico legislature, 
urging it to prevent additional Puerto Rican laborers from traveling to Hawai‘i 
(Córdova Dávila 1919—see petition attached to letter). In it, they chronicled 
the abuses they experienced on the sugar plantations: 
In Hawaii, we Porto Ricans are abused and d[e]spised more than any race 
. . . . Today the law of  the lash does not exist today on the plantations, 
but there is still committed a large number of  wrongs against the Porto 
Ricans . . . . 
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The Porto Ricans live in the worst houses. On the estate of  the Honokaa 
Sugar Company[,] the houses are pig-stys, and we live like goats in a 
corral. . . . All the other races have better houses, and their conditions are 
better than ours, except the Filipinos.
The cost of  living is very high, and what we earn is not enough to cloth[e] 
our families. 
They also described biased territorial authorities who targeted and 
criminalized Puerto Ricans for petty crimes:
 In the island of  Hawaii, which is the most important of  this 
Territory, there is no justice for the Porto Rican. . . . When a Porto Rican 
commits a small offense, they send the whole police force to take him to 
jail, and put him in a cell, where he is given a “componte” in order to have 
him confess to a crime which he has not committed. 
They recounted the denials of  their voting rights and praised the 
“Democratic lawyers” who valiantly defended those rights: 
 They usurp our civil rights, as we can prove by the case of  San-
chez vs. Kalauokalani. Mr. David Kalauokalani, City and County Clerk of  
Honolulu, refused to register the Porto Ricans as electors, claiming that 
Porto Ricans of  Hawaii are not American citizens under the Jones Bill. 
 We Porto Ricans engaged to defend us Messrs. Joseph and 
J. Bert Lightfoot, Democratic lawyers of  Honolulu, and after a brilliant 
defense, the Supreme Court of  Hawaii decided that the plaintiff, Manuel 
Olivieri Sanchez and all Porto Ricans residing in Hawaii are as much citi-
zens of  the United States as those who have resided, or who do reside in 
Porto Rico. Messrs. Lightfoot defended us because of  love of  the profes-
sion, for we paid them little for so important work, owing to the perplexed 
circumstances through which we are passing. . . . 
 During the last electoral campaign in Oct[o]ber, 1918, Mr. A. A. 
Hapai, County Clerk of  Hawaii, refused to register us as electors on ac-
count of  political intrigues, and we appealed to the Board of  Registration 
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of  Electors, who decided in our favor. 
They also identified the consequences faced by those who dared to defend 
Puerto Rican rights: 
 Here, any one who rises in defense of  the Porto Ricans is hated 
by the chiefs. The only Porto Rican, who from time to time publishes ar-
ticles defending us in the newspapers, is Mr. Manuel Olivieri Sanchez, and 
for this is unpopular, not fi nding employment, and has been persecuted 
and freely insulted through the press. (Córdova Dávila 1919—see petition 
attached to letter)22 
The petition was forwarded to the Bureau of  Insular Affairs, the 
Department of  Interior, the Governor of  Hawai‘i, and the Hawai‘i Territory 
Attorney General. The Puerto Rico Senate and House of  Representatives 
adopted resolutions to investigate their justice claims. The Senate declared the 
Puerto Rican laborers “victims of  unjust treatment, contrary to the American 
laws . . . [and that] the authorities of  said islands who allow such treatment are 
responsible for these acts” (Córdova Dávila 1919).23 The House found that 
Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i “are abused and live in bad conditions . . . [and] in the 
Island of  Hawaii there is no justice for Porto Ricans” (Córdova Dávila 1919).24 
The House urged the Resident Commissioner to conduct an investigation 
“causing the Porto Ricans living in Hawaii to be respected in their rights” 
(Córdova Dávila 1919—see House Resolution) and the Senate called for the 
repatriation of  Puerto Ricans “who do not wish to remain in those islands 
under such conditions” (Córdova Dávila 1919—see Senate Resolution).25 
The petition, according to the HSPA, was “gotten up by a bunch of  agitators in Honolulu 
headed by a disgruntled ex-plantation laborer named M. O. Sanchez.”
The HSPA clai med that the petition was “without the slightest foundation 
in fact” and that “no discrimination against the Porto Ricans is made in the 
Islands” (Charges Made by Porto Ricans 1919, 1). The petition, according 
to the HSPA, was “gotten up by a bunch of  agitators in Honolulu headed 
by a disgruntled ex-plantation laborer named M. O. Sanchez” (1919, 1). The 
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Hawai‘i Attorney General conducted an investigation by requesting that 
the accused officials and plantation managers respond to the Puerto Rican 
laborers’ charges. The investigatio n resulted in a voluminous report that 
included positive testimonials from “happy” Puerto Rican laborers on selected 
plantations (Carr 1989, 336). They contended that their living conditions were 
much better than what they had in Puerto Rico and that their work hours were 
fair (Irwin 1919).26 
Thus, only two years after obtaining U.S. citizenship, many Puerto Ricans 
in Hawai‘i were still “abused and despised,” as they had argued in their petition. 
But by petitioning the Puerto Rico legislature, as well as participating in larger 
labor struggles alongside other racial groups—such as a major walkout in 
192027—Puerto Ricans resisted subordination on and off  of  the plantations. 
Moreover, U.S. citizenship did not halt, or even slow, the damaging racial 
characterizations of  Puerto Ricans spread by governmental bodies, plantation 
managers, and media. In the 1920s, the U.S. War Department wanted to ship 
more Puerto Ricans to Hawai‘i to build up “the class of  resident most desired, 
loyal Americans” (Carr 1989, 341). The Bureau of  Insular Affairs and War 
Department instructed the Commander of  the Hawaiian Department of  the 
Army to consider the “military advantage” of  stimulating the immigration of  
Puerto Ricans to Hawai‘i to increase the numbers of  enlisted men (1989, 345). 
The military report commissioned to study the importation of  Puerto Ricans 
to Hawai‘i again reproduced racialized images of  Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans. The 
study reported that Puerto Ricans were “so difficult of  accomplishment,” 
“ha[d] the highest ratio as law breakers,” and had the highest “percentage 
of  illiterates . . . except [for] the Filipinos” (1989, 347—quotng report). 
Their “redeeming characteristic,” the study claimed, reflected their simple-
mindedness and lack of  ambition: “succeeding generations of  Porto Ricans 
stay with the land and remain in rural districts,” while the Japanese, Chinese, 
and Filipinos “haunt the Cities . . . preferring ‘White collar’ jobs to labor in the 
fields” (1989, 347). 
On the other hand, the report also attributed Puerto Ricans’ perceived 
military ability to their racial heredity: “In comparing the Porto Rican with 
other types, such as the Filipino, one must go back to their blood. They have 
some good fighting blood. Their Spanish blood was excellent Infantry stuff. 
The Carib Indian was rather a good fighter” (Carr 1989, 350). This praise for 
Puerto Ricans was partly done to discourage importation of  Filipino laborers 
and to limit the political power of  other Asian laborers: bringing in U.S. 
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citizen Puerto Ricans would “neutralize the present political menace of  the 
predominating Oriental races . . . who[], it was feared, would] eventually exert 
a powerful political influence in Governmental affairs” (1989, 351). Hawai‘i’s 
sugar planters opposed the U.S. government’s attempts to bring in more 
Puerto Ricans because the planters did not want a new block of  U.S. citizen 
voters with constitutional rights, and because they worried that “the mulatto[,] 
being in the ascendancy politically in Porto Rico[,] would undoubtedly . . . 
create many complications which might destroy [the planters’] efforts to get 
jibaros [poor whites]” (1989, 358—quoting Letter from J.K. Butler, Secretary-
Treasurer of  Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, to Patrick J. Hurley, 14 
October 1931).28 
Even through the 1930s, local politicians sparred over whether to import 
additional “loyal American citizens” from Puerto Rico to cultivate and harvest 
sugar cane in Hawai‘i. After the media reported that the sugar planters 
intended to bring in 10,000 more workers from Puerto Rico, Manuel Olivieri 
Sánchez penned an op-ed in the newspaper contending that the sugar planters 
were threatening to bring in more Puerto Ricans to force the “anti-Puerto 
Rican” unemployed laborers back to work on the plantations (Olivieri Sánchez 
1931).29 In reality, he argued, “Porto Rican labor is not wanted here nor any 
other imported labor with citizen rights” because such laborers would take 
jobs away from others and because “as American citizens they complicate 
Hawaiian politics” (Olivieri Sánchez 1931). “[S]ince when did American 
citizens complicate local politics?” he asked. “Supposing the Porto Ricans 
come here and take advantage of  their rights as American citizens and vote, 
does that make them undesirable? Don’t the American citizens from Japan, 
Scotland and Alabama do the same thing? I sincerely believe that 10,000 
Porto Rican voters will not complicate Hawaiian politics but would leaven the 
electorate and thus preclude any other racial group from ‘block-control’ of  
both political parties” (Olivieri Sánchez 1931).
As shown by their acts of  protest, Puerto Ricans were deeply critical of  the ways in which 
laws were used to benefit the powerful.
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Thus, rather than rejecting the law and rights assertion as futile, or blindly 
embracing the law as a cure-all, Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans, like Olivieri Sánchez, 
embraced a complex “double consciousness” about their experience with law 
and legal process. As shown by their acts of  protest, Puerto Ricans were deeply 
critical of  the ways in which laws were used to benefit the powerful. At the 
same time, they held an aspirational vision of  law as a vehicle to validate their 
place in the U.S. polity, and fought for and attained U.S. citizenship in Sanchez. 
They realized, however, that mere legal recognition as U.S. citizens would 
not mean true equality on the plantation and in society. But they had an 
“unalterable conviction that something must be done, that action must be 
taken” (Bell 1992, 199) within the law and beyond; that they needed to take 
the fight simultaneously to judges, policymakers, bureaucrats and the general 
populace. Indeed, they continued to fight for both the rights attendant to 
citizenship and against continued cultural oppression and unequal treatment, 
all while acknowledging the law’s dual power to oppress and open small paths 
toward liberation. As critical race theorists recognize, their double consciousness 
embraced the concept of  legal indeterminacy alongside “the core belief  in a 
liberating law that transcends indeterminacy” (Matsuda 1987, 341). 
V. CONCLUSION
Over six months after the Jones Act collectively naturalized citizens of  Puerto 
Rico as U.S. citizens, the Supreme Court of  the Territory of  Hawai‘i held that 
all “citizens of  Porto Rico” acquired U.S. citizenship, including those “who 
were at the date of  the act of  March 2, 1917, absent from Porto Rico” (Sanchez 
v. Kalauokalani 1917, 27). As a result of  Manuel Olivieri Sánchez’s advocacy and 
the community’s solidarity, Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i attained the right to vote 
in the Territory and gained a measure of  economic mobility. 
As described above, the Sanchez case—viewed in the context of  the harsh 
practices and laws that governed the plantation system—sheds light on Puerto 
Ricans’ experiences with law and legal process in Hawai‘i. Hawai‘i’s Puerto 
Ricans long understood the harsh plantation law’s ability to subordinate, but at 
the same time embraced the distinct value of  rights and the promise of  liberal 
legalism. They passionately invoked these legal ideals in their struggle for U.S. 
citizenship in Sanchez, while recognizing that aspects of  subordination would 
continue even if  they achieved the legal status of  “United States citizen.” They 
therefore continued to battle for the rights associated with that citizenship 
and against cultural vilification and unjust treatment on the plantations and in 
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greater Hawai‘i society. For Hawai‘i’s Puerto Ricans, these two viewpoints—
this double consciousness—combined powerfully to create a source of  
strength in the face of  adversity.
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NOTES
1  Transcript of  Mandamus Hearing, Sanchez v. Kalauokalani (1917, 3). (No. 1024), Apr. 26, 
1917, at 3, microformed on Judiciary Supreme Court Case Records (1904–1960).
2  In my citations to archival materials and historical cases, I have used the names and words 
as they appear in the original documents. In my own references to these names and words, I 
have attempted to correct misspellings, provide accents according to current usage, and refer 
to individuals using both surnames according to Latina/o naming customs, where available. 
3  News articles reported that “a great many of  the Porto Ricans of  Hawaii are apparently 
without a country” (Porto Ricans of  Hawaii Not Citizens 1917, 1) and quoted Olivieri 
Sánchez’s attorney as stating that, “[u]nder that decision, which it is law now, a Porto Rican 
anywhere but in Porto Rico is a man without a country” (Porto Ricans Here Not Entitled to 
Vote in Territory, 191, 7). 
4  Attached to the letter was a Puerto Rican laborer petition to Puerto Rico Legislature, dated 
5 March 1919). 
5  Between 1900 and 1901, eleven groups of  Puerto Ricans arrived in Hawai‘i (Beechert 1985, 
21). Many of  the members of  the first group were victims of  the 1899 San Ciriaco hurricane 
that decimated acres of  homes and farmland in Puerto Rico (Malavet 2008, 125). Portions of  
Parts II and IV of  this article are drawn substantially verbatim from Serrano (2011).
6  The “cession of  lands resulting from the victory in the Spanish-American War, with their 
fairly dense populations posed difficulties” for the new colonial power (Román and Simmons 
2002, 452). Even though the United States desired to control overseas territories, it had no 
intention of  inviting the racially and culturally different peoples to “one day join the American 
body politic as full and equal citizens” (Lazos Vargas 2001, 929). For a description of  U.S. 
Representatives’ racialized characterizations of  Puerto Ricans, see Román (1998, 29). One 
American leader stated that Puerto Ricans “have the Latin-American excitability, and I think 
America should go slow in granting them anything like autonomy. Their civilization is not 
at all like ours yet. . . . The mixture of  black and white in Porto Rico threatens to create a 
race of  mongrels of  no use to anyone . . . . A governor from the South or with knowledge 
of  Southern remedies for that trouble, could, if  a wise man, do much. . . .” (Wagenheim and 
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Jiménez de Wagenheim 1994, 122). For a description of  early racialized characterizations 
of  Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, Guamanians, Filipinos and Cubans in the context of  U.S. 
imperialism in 1898, see Thompson (2010, 27–30). 
7  The Chinese Exclusion Act of  1882, which was extended to the new Territory of  Hawai‘i, 
prohibited the entry of  Chinese to the United States (Takaki 1983, 25; Ancheta 1998, 25). 
The Foran Act, also called the “1885 Alien Contract Labor Law,” prohibited immigrants from 
entering the United States to work under labor contracts (Foran Act 1885). The Foran Act 
became applicable to Hawai‘i upon its official annexation to the United States (Beechert 1985, 
326). 
8  The newspaper article also noted that the Attorney General’s ruling “will, however, settle 
the question, as it is not likely that any of  the Porto Rican laborers will insist upon the right to 
vote” (No Right to Vote 1902, 3).
9  For example, one news article reported that the U.S. “has just come through one of  the 
most serious industrial crises of  the century—a hand-to-hand contest between capital and 
labor” and that Hawai‘i contains “an object lesson which statesmen at Washington would 
do well to study on the eve of  the reconvening of  Congress [because] . . . . [t]he labor 
problem of  the Hawaiian Territory contains many aspects which must be encountered in the 
development of  the Philippines” (The Labor Issue in the Islands 1902, 1). 
10  Both critical race theory and critical legal studies draw many of  their insights from legal 
realism, a pragmatic school of  thought in law that emerged as a response to legal formalism 
(Singer 1988, 503). 
11  Also from Memmi (1965, 123): “The candidate for assimilation almost always comes to tire of  
the exorbitant price which he must pay and which he never finishes owing . . . . [H]e has assumed 
all the accusations and condemnations of  the colonizer, that he is becoming accustomed to 
looking at his own people through the eyes of  their procurer.”
12  Matsuda (1987, 334) asserts that Frederick Douglass also engaged in this type of  “radical 
constitutionalism” when he broke from the Garrisonian abolitionists and embraced the 
Constitution as a tool to fight against slavery.
13  Similarly, legal scholar Derrick Bell urges activists to embrace this dual reality—to know 
that efforts may be unsuccessful, but to take action because it is necessary: 
[I]t is not a matter of  choosing between the pragmatic recog-
nition that racism is permanent no matter what we do, or an 
idealism based on the long-held dream of  attaining a society 
free of  racism. Rather, it is a question of  both, and. Both the 
recognition of  the futility of  action—where action is more 
civil rights strategies destined to fail—and the unalterable 
conviction that something must be done, that action must be 
taken. (B ell 1992, 199) 
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14  Williams further describes the deep meaning of  rights to African Americans:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet 
it is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so 
hard that we gave them life where there was none before. We 
held onto them, put the hope of  them into our wombs, and 
mothered them—not just the notion of  them. We nurtured 
rights and gave rights life. And this was not the dry process 
of  reifi cation, from which life is drained and reality fades as 
the cement of  conceptual determinism hardens round—but 
its opposite. This was the resurrection of  life from 400-year-
old ashes; the parthenogenesis of  unfertilized hope. (Williams 
1987, 430)
15  Indeed, critical race theorists “embrace both a postmodernist skepticism toward the 
efficacy, neutrality, and inevitability of  law and a concomitant modernist reliance upon law and 
enlightened reasoning as sources of  antiracist resistance” (Hutchinson 2002, 1477).
16  The report also described them as “untidy . . . compared with the tidy Japanese and other 
Asiatics employed in the islands[.]” (1901, 26). This fact, the report states, “has prejudiced 
plantation managers and the people of  the islands against the Porto Ricans” (1901, 26). 
17  Miranda was described as “a fine specimen of  the half-breed Spaniard of  the Antilles, yet 
his bold demeanor under the awful circumstances in which he stood denoted him a dangerous 
man of  thoroughbred type” (Justice Is Not Slow 1904, 3). Even his own lawyer urged the jury 
to consider his low mental condition: he was “but one degree above a brute” (Murder First 
Degree 1904, 1). 
18  Noting that his father, a mayor of  a town in Puerto Rico, swore allegiance to the United 
States and would call meetings in the family house to advise Puerto Ricans to “stick to the 
United States.” 
19  See Lokpez v. Fernández (1943, 514)—ruling that under the Jones Act, the phrase “citizens 
of  Puerto Rico” no longer refers to a general political status, but rather, a political status 
restricted to residence in Puerto Rico. 
20  See Puerto Rican Petition (1919) praising the lawyers’ “brilliant” representation of  Sanchez, 
and Porto Rican Held American Citizen (1917, 7) characterizing the decision as “of  deep 
interest to all Porto Ricans in these islands who have not taken out papers of  citizenship.”
21  For example, two Puerto Rican women, Henrietta Ortiz and Margaret Maldonado, became 
teachers in 1924 and 1925, respectively (Carr 1987, 101). 
22  They ended with a call for repatriation to Puerto Rico because “a Porto Rican in Hawaii 
is of  less importance than a criminal in Porto Rico,” and urged the Puerto Rico legislature 
to send a commission to Hawai‘i and to publish the petition in a Puerto Rico newspaper, La 
Democracia, to “prevent our brothers from emigrating” (Córdova Dávila 1919—see petition 
attached to letter). 
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23  The letter from Resident Commissioner Félix Córdova Dávila to Bureau of  Insular Affairs, 
also attached a Puerto Rico Senate Resolution.
24  In addition to the workers’ petiton and the Puerto Rican Senate Resolution, Resident 
Commissioner Córdova Dávila’s letter to Bureau of  Insular Affairs contained a Puerto Rico 
House Resolution of  30 April 1919.
25  The petition “caused a sensation in [Puerto Rico] and was the subject of  considerable 
press comment[.]” (Charges Made By Porto Ricans 1919, 1). Shortly thereafter, the Puerto 
Rico legislature passed an act that authorized the Commissioner of  Agriculture and Labor of  
Puerto Rico “to intervene . . . in all matters concerning emigration of  laborers from Porto 
Rico,” among other things (Whalen 2005, 20). 
26  The letter transmitted the report.
27  In January 1920, three hundred Puerto Rican and Spanish sugar plantation laborers joined 
2,600 Filipino laborers in walking off  their jobs at various plantations on O‘ahu (Okihiro 
1991, 70).
28  The group of  342 Puerto Ricans who emigrated to Hawai‘i in 1921 was recruited by 
the HSPA after thousands of  Japanese workers left the plantations following the strikes of  
1918–20 (Carr 1987, 101). Many in this group of  Puerto Ricans were union activists (López 
2005, 48). 
29 Olivieri Sánchez (1931) argued that the sugar planters were sending a message to the local 
“anti-Porto Ricans in Honolulu—the unemployed citizen-laborers” that if  they did not get 
back onto the plantations to harvest the cane, the planters would be forced to go to Puerto 
Rico for American citizen workers.
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